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Abstract 
The introduction of the European Union (EU) Settlement Procedure in 2008 aimed at 
promoting the procedural efficiency of cartel investigations by the European Commission 
(EC). We use a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by the EC for cartelization 
from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the impact of the settlement procedure on the probability to 
file an appeal. Based on the estimation of a model of the firm’s decision to appeal in the pre-
settlement era, we subsequently run out-of-sample predictions to estimate the number of 
hypothetical appeals cases in the settlement era absent the settlement procedure. Our findings 
of a settlement-induced reduction in the number of appeals of up to 55 percent allow the 
conclusion that the introduction of the settlement procedure generated substantial additional 
benefits to society beyond its undisputed key contribution of a faster and more efficient 
handling of cartel investigations by the EC.  
Keywords Antitrust policy, cartels, settlements, appeals, ex-post evaluation, European Union 
JEL Class K21, L41  
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1 Introduction 
Fighting cartels is a major priority of competition policy in the European Union (EU). Acting 
in concert with national competition authorities, the European Commission (EC) has made 
considerable efforts to promote competitiveness by detecting and punishing cartels. Based on 
the fundamental reform of EU competition law as part of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/20031, concrete examples of policy reforms include the implementation of a leniency 
program, a major revision of the fine guidelines, the promotion of the private enforcement of 
anti-cartel laws and an intensified cooperation between competition authorities, particularly in 
the fight against international cartels.  
 The most recent substantial reform of the (public) cartel enforcement process in the 
European Union was the introduction of a settlement procedure in June 2008. Generally, the 
EU settlement procedure in cartel cases enables the EC to close investigations faster by 
eliminating or reducing several procedural steps – such as full access to file, drafting and 
translations or oral hearings and interpretation – required under the standard procedure. 
Parties who admit liability and waive these procedural rights receive a discount of 10 percent 
on the final fine imposed. Although it took the EC until 2010 to close the first two ‘test’ cases 
under the new settlement procedure, since then, 16 out of a total of 24 decided cartel cases 
were (at least partly) settled turning the procedure into an influential cartel enforcement tool.   
 Despite the fact that the key aim of the introduction of the settlement procedure was seen 
in the faster and more efficient handling of cartel investigations by the EC, both academics 
and practitioners have identified and discussed several possible indirect impacts of the 
settlement procedure on various stages of the cartel enforcement process. Examples include 
the determination of fines, the operability of the leniency program, the probability and success 
of appeals, follow-on private enforcement as well as overall deterrence. Although it would 
generally be desirable to empirically investigate the existence and relevance of all these 
indirect impacts, the expected clearly negative effect of the decision to settle on the (success) 
probability of an appeal makes an empirical assessment of this interrelationship a particularly 
worthwhile exercise. This reasoning is supported by the observation that the years after the 
introduction of the settlement procedure indeed experienced a substantial reduction in both 
the absolute number as well as the rate of appeals.  
 In this context, we use a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by the EC for 
cartelization from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the impact of the settlement procedure on the 
                                                            
1  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  
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probability to file an appeal. Based on the estimation of a model of the firm’s decision to 
appeal in the pre-settlement era, we subsequently run out-of-sample predictions to estimate 
the number of hypothetical appeals cases in the settlement era absent the settlement 
procedure. Comparing these estimates with the actual number of appeals, we find a 
settlement-induced reduction in the number of appeals of between 20 percent and 55 percent. 
We conclude that the introduction of the settlement procedure generated substantial additional 
benefits to society beyond its undisputed key contribution of a faster and more efficient 
handling of cartel investigations by the EC. 
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The subsequent second section 
introduces into the cartel enforcement process in the European Union, followed by a 
characterization of the new settlement procedure and its impact on the cartel enforcement 
process in general and on the appeals process in particular in Section 3. Our empirical 
analysis of the impact of the EU Settlement Procedure on the probability to file an appeal is 
presented in the fourth section. While Section 4.1 provides a detailed description of the 
construction of our data set, our empirical strategy is explained in Section 4.2. Following the 
presentation and discussion of our estimation results in Section 4.3, Section 5 concludes the 
paper with a summary of its major insights and a discussion of selected policy implications.     
2 The Cartel Enforcement Process in the European Union  
Article 101 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits 
agreements between companies which prevent, restrict or distort competition in the EU and 
which may affect trade between Member States. Although the prohibition generally applies to 
both (anti-competitive) horizontal and vertical agreements, in the following, we will focus on 
a brief characterization of the EU enforcement process for horizontal (hard-core) cartel 
agreements which can broadly be subdivided further into, first, the investigation of and 
decision on a possible infringement by the EC and, second, the initiation of an (optional) 
appeals process against the EC cartel decision by the convicted parties.  
2.1 Investigation and Decision by the European Commission   
In general, the cartel enforcement process within the EC can be subdivided further into six 
subsequent stages (see, e.g., Laina and Laurinen (2013) and Bellis (2014b)): (1) initial 
information gathering, (2) preliminary investigations, (3) case proceedings, (4) statement of 
objections, (5) oral hearings and (6) decision. As cartel members are typically aware of the 
fact that cartel agreements are illegal, they keep them in secrecy and initial information 
gathering therefore becomes the most crucial step in the enforcement activities of the EC (see 
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Hüschelrath (2010) for a systematic overview). While a complaint by a competitor, a 
customer, another agency or a (former) employee used to be the dominant way to initiate 
cartel investigations in the EU, the introduction of the leniency program in 1996 – in 
combination with significant reforms of the program in 2002 and 2006 – provided incentives 
for cartel members to report their involvement in a cartel and therefore gained tremendously 
in importance as case generator. Furthermore, ex-officio investigations in combination with a 
closer international cooperation between enforcement agencies play an increasing role in 
contemporary cartel detection.  
 Subsequent to the initial gathering of information on an alleged cartel infringement, the EC 
can decide to open preliminary proceedings as part of which it can use certain investigative 
powers such as, e.g., dawn raids or other information requests to be able to assess whether the 
rules laid down in Article 101 TFEU have been breached. At the end of the preliminary 
proceedings, the EC has to make a decision whether the collected material appears sufficient 
to initiate case proceedings – and therefore an in-depth investigation – or alternatively to 
close the investigation (see EC (2013)).  
 In case an in-depth investigation is commenced and results in the confirmation of the EC’s 
initial concerns, the EC furnishes a statement of objections (SO) in which it – based on the 
collected pieces of evidence – informs the respective firms in writing of the objections raised 
against them. According to Laina and Laurinen (2013), this (time-consuming) process 
regularly leads to SO’s with a size of several hundreds of pages (which may additionally have 
to be translated in different languages). After the submission of the SO to the accused firms, 
they have certain rights to defense such as ‘access to file’, i.e., they are allowed to see all non-
confidential pieces of evidence collected by the EC during its investigation (implying a time-
consuming screening process of the EC beforehand to separate confidential from non-
confidential pieces of evidence). Subsequently, the parties have the right to reply to the SO in 
writing and to request an oral hearing with an independent hearing officer (see EC (2013)).    
 After reconsidering its own analysis and results in light of the feedback of the accused 
firms, the EC may decide to abandon (part of) its initial objections (or even to close the case). 
If the EC’s concerns are not fully dispelled, it drafts a decision prohibiting the respective 
infringement. The draft decision is then submitted to the Advisory Committee (composed of 
representatives of the Member States’ competition authorities) for a final check. If fines2 are 
                                                            
2  In the European Union, cartel fines generally aim at punishment and deterrence thereby reflecting both the 
gravity and the duration of the infringement. The maximum fine level – which is a function of the percentage 
of a firm’s annual sales of the product concerned in the infringement, the duration of the infringement as well 
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proposed in the draft decision – as usually the case in cartel investigations – the Committee 
meets a second time to specifically discuss them (see EC (2013)). Eventually, the draft 
decision is submitted to the College of Commissioners which adopts the decision.   
2.2 The Appeals Process against Decisions by the European Commission   
As any decision by either a court or a public authority is made under uncertainty, it is 
considered a constitutional (or even human) right of the losing party to seek a reconsideration 
of their arguments as part of an appeals (or judicial review3) process (see Hüschelrath and 
Smuda (2015) for a review of the law and economics literature). Under EU competition law in 
general, and for EC cartel cases in particular, the appellate court proceedings can be either 
one- or two-stage. At the first stage, a cartel member that has serious concerns with a (fining) 
decision of the EC can file an appeal with the General Court (GC) of the European Union (see 
EC (2013)).4 The GC – previously known as the Court of First Instance (CFI) – is composed 
of at least one judge from each EU Member State, however, sits in chambers of usually three 
or five judges. Substantively, four main categories of argument can broadly be distinguished 
in an appeal against an EC cartel decision: fine levels, procedural aspects, facts/standard of 
proof aspects, and substantive assessment issues. In any case, the first-stage appeal must be 
initiated within two months of the earlier of either the publication of the Commission’s 
decision or the notification of the firm.  
 Generally, the GC not only has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by 
the EC, it also has full jurisdiction to review the entire Commission decision (including a 
repetition of the full assessment process). In practice, however, the GC usually focuses on an 
assessment of the factors linked to the correct application of the respective law provisions, 
such as cartel duration, the gravity of the infringement or the application of the leniency 
program (see Geradin and Henry (2005) or Harding and Gibbs (2005)). Typically, the GC 
does not aim at replacing the Commission’s assessment of evidence with its own. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
as aggravating or mitigating circumstances – is capped at 10 percent of the overall annual turnover of a firm 
(see EC (2013)).  
3  From a law perspective, it is important to differentiate between the appeals process and the judicial review 
process (see, e.g., Schweitzer (2013) for a discussion of the latter with respect to EU competition law). 
Technically, the appeals process focuses on decisions by lower courts that are reassessed by higher courts on 
the merits of the decision under appeal, while the judicial review process concentrates on assessments of 
decisions by a public authority (e.g., the European Commission or a national competition authority) by one or 
two court levels that will focus on the legality of the decision under review only. While important from a 
legal perspective, the economic implications of a differentiation between both processes must be considered 
as rather minor, thus justifying our approach to simply use the term ‘appeals process’ in the remainder of this 
article. 
4  See the consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2010/C 177/02. 
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 At the second stage of the appeals process in EC cartel cases, judgments of the GC can be 
appealed before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the unsuccessful party, i.e., either the 
convicted firm, the EC itself or both. The ECJ is the highest European appellate court and has 
the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by the GC. However, in its 
proceedings, it limits itself to questions of law and has no jurisdiction to (re-)review the facts 
and analyze the evidence that the GC used to support its findings and decision.  
3 The Settlement Procedure in the Cartel Enforcement Process in the European Union  
In this section, we provide an introduction to the settlement procedure and its implementation 
in European Commission (EC) cartel cases. Following an initial general characterization of 
the EU settlement procedure as part of the entire EC cartel enforcement process in Section 
3.1, we subsequently provide a more detailed discussion of the impact of the settlement 
procedure on the subsequent appeals process in Section 3.2.  
3.1 Characterization of the EU Settlement Procedure 
The EU Settlement Procedure was introduced in late June 2008 with Regulation 622/20085 
and a Commission Notice6 on the conduct of settlement procedures. It enables the European 
Commission to close investigations faster by eliminating or reducing several procedural steps 
– such as full access to file, drafting and translations or oral hearings and interpretation – 
required under the standard procedure.7 Parties who admit liability and waive these procedural 
rights receive a discount of 10 percent on the final fine imposed. Through the introduction of 
the settlement notice, the EU aims at enabling “… the Commission to handle faster and more 
efficiently cartel cases …”8 thus freeing up resources for additional cases and strengthening 
the deterrence effect of cartel enforcement.  
 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to present a detailed characterization of the 
EU Settlement Procedure,9 it is important for our subsequent empirical analysis to briefly 
characterize the respective main steps of the procedure (see generally Laina and Laurinen 
(2013) for a more detailed description). Based on our subdivision of the cartel enforcement 
                                                            
5  Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008 of 30 June 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as 
regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, OJ L 171/3, 1.7.2008. Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to 
Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 123/18, 27.4.2004) lays down rules concerning the participation of 
the parties concerned in such proceedings.  
6  Commission Notice on the conduct of settlement procedures in view of the adoption of decisions pursuant to 
Article 7 and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases (2008/C 167/01), OJ C 167/1, 
2.7.2008. 
7  See Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, OJ L 123/18.  
8  Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008, OJ L 171/3, p. 1. 
9  See Bay (2010), Bellis (2014a, 2014b), Olsen and Jephcott (2010) or Vascott (2013) for practitioner’s 
perspectives on the functioning of the EU Settlement Procedure. 
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process into six subsequent sections characterized above, the first two stages – initial 
information gathering and preliminary investigations – are largely unaffected by the 
introduction of the settlement procedure. However, if the Commission decides to commence 
with case proceedings, the settlement procedure may come into play. Technically, although 
the parties may express their interest in a settlement, the EC decides whether to send letters to 
the involved companies informing of the decision to initiate proceedings in view of settlement 
and requesting them to express their interest in settlement. Although legally such a decision 
can take place at any point in time before the Commission issues a statement of objections 
rather the beginning of the case proceedings appears to be the most likely point in time (see 
Bellis (2014b)). 
 The settlement procedure as such can broadly be subdivided further into the following five 
steps:10 (1) 1st Formal Meeting, (2) Technical Meetings, (3) 2nd Formal Meeting, (4) 3rd 
Formal Meeting and (5) Settlement Submission. As part of the initial formal settlement 
meeting, the EC presents its assessment to the parties – in bilateral meetings with EC senior 
staff, the case team and a settlement unit’s representative – and discloses its evidence used to 
establish potential objections, liability and fines. In subsequent technical meetings with the 
case team, the parties present their views and arguments to the EC and especially discuss the 
scope of the infringement (i.e., duration and gravity) as well as the value of affected sales 
(both key drivers of the level of the fine). Although the EC does not enter any form of 
bargaining, in practice, these meetings provide possibilities for the companies to influence the 
EC’s views (see, e.g., Hansen and Yoshida (2012) or Bay (2010)).  
 The second formal settlement meeting is then used to receive verification that an 
(informal) agreement between the EC and the respective companies exists regarding both the 
scope of infringement and the value of affected sales. Only in the subsequent third formal 
settlement meeting, the EC discloses the maximum amount of the fine and confirms the form 
and timing of the ‘streamlined’ (i.e., much shorter11) settlement submission and eventually the 
final decision on the settled case (see generally Bellis (2014a, 2014b) for further information).  
 Comparing the standard cartel enforcement process with the settled enforcement process 
reveals that there are no apparent differences in the first two stages. However, as soon as the 
case proceedings are commenced, the usual enforcement process is partly replaced and partly 
                                                            
10  See generally Dekeyser (2012), Laina and Laurinen (2013), Laina and Bogdanov (2014) and Van 
Ginderachter (2014) for more detailed information on the EU Settlement Procedure from inside the 
Commission. 
11  According to Laina and Laurinen (2013), the amount of pages to be written is reduced from ‘several 
hundreds of pages’ under the standard procedure to ‘on average 20 to 40 pages’ under the settlement 
procedure. 
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complemented by the settlement process, ceteris paribus, suggesting an increase in EC 
workload and no apparent increase in procedural efficiency. However, as already indicated 
above, the respective procedural efficiencies are expected to be realized especially by 
eliminating or reducing procedural steps required under the standard procedure such as full 
access to file12, drafting and translations as well as oral hearing and interpretation. Although 
parts of these procedures already take place before finalizing the statement of objections, the 
lion part is scheduled to take place after the SO under the standard procedure and the 
settlement procedure is therefore expected to reduce the overall duration of EC cartel 
investigations substantially (see Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015) for supporting empirical 
evidence).  
 Before we turn to a detailed discussion of a possible impact of the settlement procedure on 
the probability to file an appeal, it adds value to complement the general discussion of the EU 
cartel enforcement process in the settlement era with some descriptive empirical evidence. In 
this respect, Figure 1 below plots the number and types of all cartel cases decided by the 
European Commission from 2000 to 2015 (excluding three readopted cases13).  
  
Figure 1: Number and Types of Decided EC Cartel Cases (2000-2015) 
 
As generally shown in Figure 1, the number of decided cases varies quite substantially 
between the years with 2000 (2 cases) and 2001 (10 cases) delineating the spectrum. With 
respect to settlements, Figure 1 shows that, between 2010 and 2015, we observe in sum 18 
                                                            
12  Granting full access to file usually demands resource intensive preparation efforts in the form of screening 
‘tens of thousands of pages of documents’ for confidentiality (see Kroes (2008)).  
13  The cases are Gas Insulated Switchgear (Case COMP/39.966), Steel Beams (Case COMP/38.907) and 
Manufacture of other Organic Basic Chemicals (Case COMP/39.003). 
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settled cases out of which 5 cases14 were so-called hybrid settlements in which typically one 
of the companies decided to opt out of the settlement procedure (see generally Laina and 
Bogdanov (2014) for further information). Furthermore, the first two cases15 – settled in 2010 
– were special in the sense that they were converted into settlement cases relatively late in the 
investigation process (see Vascott (2013)) thus questioning them as suitable cases for an 
empirical analysis of the settlement procedure. Overall, the fact that 16 out of a total of 24 
decided cartel cases since 2011 were (at least partly) settled suggests that the settlement 
procedure has become an influential cartel enforcement tool.   
3.2 The Impact of the Settlement Procedure on the Appeals Process  
In addition to the desired direct impact of the settlement procedure – that is, the faster and 
more efficient handling of cartel investigations by the Commission – both academics and 
practitioners have identified and discussed several possible indirect impacts of the 
introduction of the settlement procedure on various stages of the cartel enforcement process. 
Examples include the determination of fines, the operability of the leniency program, the 
probability and success of appeals, follow-on private enforcement as well as overall 
deterrence. Without wanting to play down the relevance of any of these potential effects (see 
Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015) for a more detailed description), in the following, we 
limit our further assessment to the impact of the settlement procedure on the appeals process.  
 Although not officially stated as aim of the implementation of the EU Settlement 
Procedure, the Commission (at least implicitly) expects a reduced probability and success of 
appeals against its decisions (see, e.g., Laina and Laurinen (2013)). Although technically EC 
settlement decisions can still be appealed by the firms with either the General Court (GC, as 
first-stage EU appellate court) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ, as second-stage and 
highest EU appellate court), various requirements for a successful settlement – in particular 
admitting liability for an illegal agreement of a certain scope and value of affected sales – 
reduce the probability that the appeal will generally be successful and, if this is nevertheless 
found to be the case, that the reduction of the final fine imposed by the EC will be lower than 
for cases decided under the standard procedure. The expected reduction in the number of 
appeals is expected to lead to a corresponding reduction of the occasions at which the 
                                                            
14  The cases are Animal Feed Phosphates (Case COMP/38.866), Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (Case 
COMP/39.861), Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (Case COMP/39.914), Steel Abrasives (Case COMP/39.792) 
and Mushrooms (Case COMP/39.965).  
15  The cases are DRAMs (Case COMP/38.511) and Animal Feed Phosphates (Case COMP/38.866). In our 
empirical analysis below, we therefore exclude the respective two cases.  
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Commission is forced to defend the legality of its decisions in court thus freeing up additional 
resources for other enforcement activities. 
 Although a detailed empirical assessment of a possible impact of the settlement procedure 
on the appeals process is conducted in Section 4 below, it adds value to cast an eye on initial 
descriptive evidence. If, for example, recent years did not experience a notable change in the 
number of appeals, it appears unlikely that such an effect can be identified econometrically. 
Figure 2 below therefore plots the number and rate of appeals against EC cartel decisions for 
our observation period from 2000 to 2015.  
 
Figure 2: Number and Rate of Appeals against EC Cartel Decisions (2000-2015) 
 
As revealed by Figure 2, in the first eleven years of the observation period, the number of 
appeals vary substantially with 39 appeals (2001) and 14 appeals (2003) delineating the 
spectrum. However, providing descriptive support for a possible impact of the settlement 
procedure, the number of appeals recently experienced a substantial drop. While the average 
number of appeals in the 2000-2010 period is 25, the corresponding average for the 2011-
2015 period is found to be substantially lower at only 8 appeals (a reduction of about 68 
percent). 
 In order to take account of the fact that different years show different numbers of decisions 
(with varying numbers of involved firms) and therefore different general possibilities to file 
an appeal, Figure 2 additionally plots the respective shares of firm groups that filed an appeal 
in the year of the respective EC decision. It is shown that the identified downward trend is 
confirmed by this alternative measure: while the 2000 to 2010 period saw an average appeal 
rate of 63 percent, the 2011 to 2015 period witnessed a substantial drop to 20 percent. 
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Although other factors might have influenced this development – suggesting an econometric 
analysis – our initial descriptive findings support our claim that the settlement procedure had 
a measurable impact on the number of appeals cases brought against EC cartel decisions.  
 However, before we turn to a sophisticated empirical analysis of this relationship, it 
appears important to study the interrelation between settlements and appeals qualitatively a 
little further (see Hüschelrath and Laitenberger (2015)). Generally, from an economic 
perspective, the decision of companies to either settle or appeal depends on the expected 
returns generated by the two options. In this respect, the outcome of a settlement is fixed at 10 
percent of the final fine with only the exact level of the final fine being uncertain at the 
beginning of the settlement process. The outcome of an appeals process, however, faces a 
substantially higher amount of uncertainty. Assuming that companies file appeals merely for 
substantive and not for strategic reasons (such as achieving delays in fine payments or follow-
on private enforcement etc.), consulting the statistics of past appeals cases can provide 
important insights. In this respect, Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015) recently find that, in the 
period from 2000 to 2012, about 50 percent of 467 firm groups fined by the EC decided to 
hand in an appeal with the GC. Out of this sub-sample of 234 firm groups, roughly 47 percent 
were eventually successful in the sense of receiving a reduction of the fine originally imposed 
by the EC. With an average fine imposed by the EC of about €31 million and an average fine 
reduction on appeal of about €8.4 million, the expected percentage fine reduction on appeal in 
the past lied at about 27 percent16 of the final fine imposed by the EC (and therefore 
substantially higher than the 10 percent discount offered for settling).17 However, taking the 
probability of winning an appeal into account reduces the unconditional expected reduction to 
about 12.7 percent. 
 In essence, these findings suggest that the promising appeals cases are still brought (and 
not settled) as the expected percentage fine reductions on appeal are much higher than for 
settling the case. Cases with a low appeals success probability, however, can be expected to 
have a higher probability to be settled simply because the respective companies are better off 
with the 10 percent fine discount for settling. As a consequence, the existence and size of an 
effect of the introduction of the settlement procedure on the number of appeals will depend, 
                                                            
16  Interestingly, referring to a smaller set of (older) EC cartel cases, Ascione and Motta (2008) propose to use 
the expected fine reduction on appeal as benchmark for the fixing of the percentage discount on the final fine 
as part of the settlement procedure. They find an average expected reduction of an EC fine on appeal of about 
26 percent. 
17  However, it has to be added that the companies on average waited about 57 months from the beginning of the 
appeals process to the final decision (either by the GC or the ECJ). See Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015) for 
further information. As this waiting period generates a substantial amount of additional costs, the benefit of 
an appeals process is reduced.  
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first, on the shares of higher and highest risk appeals cases before and after its introduction 
and second, more obviously, on the future development of the relative shares of settled cases 
versus non-settled (or hybrid) cases.    
 Further descriptive insights are provided by Figure 3 which plots the percentage shares of 
firm groups that decided to (1) neither appeal nor settle, (2) only settle, (3) only appeal, and 
(4) settle and appeal for the respective case decision year18 from 2000 to 2015. 
 
Figure 3: Shares of Settling and Appealing Firm Groups (2000-2015) 
 
As shown in Figure 3, before the introduction of the EU Settlement Procedure in 2010, the 
share of firm groups that decided to appeal an EC fining decision was quite significant always 
exceeding the 50 percent threshold and reaching an average of 63 percent. However, the 
picture changes substantially after 2010. With the exceptions of 2012 and 2015, the share of 
settling (but not appealing) firm groups was much larger than the share of firm groups (fined 
under the standard procedure) that either decided to appeal or not to do so. Most interestingly, 
however, we find that – since the introduction of the EU Settlement Procedure – only two 
firm groups that decided to settle later appealed the respective EC decision.19 In this respect, 
                                                            
18  Please note that the respective settlement and appeal values correspond to the year in which the original EC 
decision on the cartel was made, i.e., a case decided by the EC in 2001 and finally ruled by a European 
appellate court in 2004 is counted as appeal in the year 2001. 
19  First, in the Euro Interest Rate Derivatives case (Case COMP/39.914), Société Générale became the first 
settling party to appeal an EC settlement decision alleging an error in the assessment of the fine (Case T-
98/14, Société Générale versus Commission, case brought on 14 February 2014). Bellis (2014a) provides 
further information on the case. Second, in the Envelopes case (Case COMP/39.780), Printeos became the 
second settling firm group that decided to file an appeal (Case T-95/15, case brought on 20 February 2015). 
More generally, companies that decided to opt out of the settlement procedure might have an increased 
probability to appeal as they might be left with the impression that the Commission eventually punished them 
with higher fines for refusing to settle (see Bellis (2014a) describing the case of Timab, a company that 
decided to opt out of the settlement procedure in Animal Feed Phosphates (Case COMP/38.866)). 
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we find clear qualitative evidence for a substantial reduction of the number of appeals for the 
sub-group of firm groups that decided to settle. 
4 Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we present our empirical analysis, subdivided further into a detailed 
description of the construction of our data set in Section 4.1, the development of our empirical 
strategy in Section 4.2 and the presentation and discussion of our estimation results in Section 
4.3.  
4.1 Construction of the Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
The data set used in this article contains detailed information on all cartel and cartel appeals 
cases decided by the EC, the GC and the ECJ between 2000 and 2015. The data on the EC 
cartel cases were collected from decisions and press releases published on the EC’s online 
platform20 in the course of the investigations, while information on the corresponding appeals 
cases was retrieved from judgment documents available at the online platform CVRIA.21 The 
data set generally combines case-related, firm group-related and firm-related information. 
 For our empirical analysis, we use the data on the firm group level – defined as firms 
within one group that are linked through ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines – 
according to the respective EC decisions, rather than on the firm level as most variables do 
not differ between single firms within one group.22 Not all types of information were available 
for all firm groups – resulting in a sample combining information on 579 firm groups that 
participated in 109 cartels (which were dealt with in 86 separate cases by the EC). Table 1 
below presents the descriptive statistics of the data set while Table 4 in the Annex provides a 
detailed overview of the names, types and descriptions of the variables used in our analysis.  
 As shown in Table 1, we have subdivided our set of variables into three categories: legal 
environment-related variables, group-related variables and case-related variables. 
Furthermore, in addition to the respective descriptive statistics for the entire population of 
cartel cases decided between 2000 and 2015 (’all’), we provide the corresponding information 
for two specific subsamples: first, all cases in which the settlement procedure factually could 
not be applied (the ‘pre-settlement era’) and all cases in which this was realistically possible 
                                                            
20  See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/index.html (last accessed on 9 January 2016). 
21  See http://curia.europa.eu (last accessed on 9 January 2016). 
22  Using firm level data would therefore result in an unjustified multiplication of the sample size, without 
providing additional information. 
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(the ‘settlement era’).23 Second, we also report the respective descriptive statistics for all 
appellants (in the pre-settlement era) and all settling firm groups (in the settlement era). 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – All Cases from 2000-2015 
Variable All Pre-Settlement 
Era 
Pre-Settlements 
Era: Appellants 
Settlement Era Settlement Era: 
Settling firms 
 Mean St D Mean St D Mean St D Mean St D Mean St D 
Legal environment-related variables 
settle_notice 0.26 (0.44) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
fine_glines_06 0.49 (0.50) 0.31 (0.46) 0.28 (0.45) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 
len_notice_02 0.36 (0.48) 0.47 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50) 0.01 (0.12) 0.00 (0.00) 
len_notice_06 0.26 (0.44) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.99 (0.12) 1.00 (0.00) 
Group-related variables 
g_a1_appeal 0.53 (0.50) 0.63 (0.48) 1.00 (0.00) 0.26 (0.44) 0.02 (0.13) 
g_settlement 0.11 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.42 (0.49) 1.00 (0.00) 
g_no_firms 1.99 (1.44) 1.88 (1.36) 1.98 (1.44) 2.32 (1.61) 2.55 (2.14) 
g_dur 76.82 (61.00) 86.69 (64.48) 84.02 (62.20) 48.33 (37.18) 50.53 (36.50) 
g_c_acbi 0.15 (0.36) 0.20 (0.40) 0.22 (0.42) 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) 
g_c_mcbi 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.24 (0.43) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 
g_rep_off 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.31) 0.12 (0.32) 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.00) 
g_def_fine_final 32.68 (80.48) 33.25 (77.93) 45.54 (92.45) 31.01 (87.67) 36.93 (77.25) 
g_lfirst 0.16 (0.37) 0.14 (0.35) 0.03 (0.18) 0.22 (0.42) 0.29 (0.46) 
g_lfollower 0.50 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.48 (0.50) 
 
Case-related variables 
c_detect 0.51 (0.50) 0.59 (0.49) 0.64 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 0.34 (0.48) 
c_g_worldwide 0.12 (0.32) 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.34 (0.48) 0.03 (0.18) 
c_no_firms 14.41 (11.63) 15.17 (12.86) 15.93 (12.75) 12.21 (6.53) 9.40 (6.76) 
Observations 579  430  270  149  62  
Notes: Means are reported with standard deviation in parentheses. The sample consists of all cartel and cartel 
appeals cases finally decided by the European Commission, the General Court and the European Court of 
Justice between 2000 and 2015. Data is used on the firm group level, i.e., firms that are linked through 
ownership and are jointly liable for fines are grouped together.  
Starting off a brief discussion of the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 with the legal 
environment-related variables, we find that for 26 percent of all firm groups in the sample, the 
settlement procedure was technically applicable. The corresponding results for the other two 
major reforms in EC cartel enforcement – the fine guidelines and the leniency program – 
however, look quite different. While the 2006 EC Guidelines for the Method of Setting Fines 
(‘Fine Guidelines’) were applicable in 49 percent of all firm groups in the sample, the two 
most recent leniency programs were applicable for 36 percent or 26 percent of all firm groups, 
respectively. However, as further revealed by Table 1, the timing of the respective reforms 
factually determine that all (or virtually all, respectively) convicted firm groups in the 
settlement era fall under the 2006 Fine Guidelines or the 2006 Leniency Notice, respectively.  
                                                            
23  Due to the fact that the first two settled cases in 2010 (DRAMs, Case COMP/38.511 and Animal Feed 
Phosphates, Case COMP/38.866) were rather specific ‘test’ cases (see Section 3.1 above for further 
information), our ‘settlement era’ applies to all cases decided after 2010. Besides disregarding these two 
‘test’ cases we also had to exclude the most recent case (Optical Disc Drives, Case COMP/39.639) from the 
settlement era as – at the time of this writing – only an EC press release providing incomplete information 
was available. 
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 Turning to the group-related variables, we find that about 53 percent of all 579 firm groups 
in our data set decided to file an appeal. However, comparing the respective values for the 
pre-settlement era and the settlement era reveals that appeals rate experienced a substantial 
reduction from about 63 percent to 26 percent. Furthermore, only 2 percent of all settling firm 
groups24 later decided to file an appeal thereby confirming the observations in Section 3 
above that the large majority of appeals were filed by non-settling firm groups. Furthermore, 
we find that for 11 percent of all firm groups in our sample the settlement procedure was 
actually applied. Conditioning on the subsample of firm groups for which the settlement 
procedure was technically available, 42 percent of them decided to settle with the EC.  
 Besides these important structural differences in the appeals and settlement variables 
between the different sub-periods, the remaining group-related variables mostly show less 
substantial differences. While the number of firms within a group increases from about 1.88 
firms in the pre-settlement era to about 2.32 in the settlement era, the duration of cartel 
participation by the group experienced a remarkable decrease from about 87 months to 48 
months. Furthermore, Table 1 reveals that – although both aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances25 generally play a minor role with a presence in only 15 or 18 percent of all 
firm groups, respectively – especially the aggravating circumstances lose further in 
significance in the settlement era (being present in only about 1 percent of the firm groups). A 
very comparable development can be observed for the repeat offender variable experiencing a 
downward trend from about 10 percent in the pre-settlement era to about 1 percent in the 
settlement era.  
 With respect to the average final fine imposed by the EC26 (deflated, in million EUR), we 
observe a reduction of about 2 million EUR when comparing pre-settlement and settlement 
eras. Furthermore, we find that appellants in the pre-settlement era and settling firm groups in 
the settlement era are characterized by substantially higher final fines (about 45.6 million 
EUR and about 36.9 million EUR, respectively) than the respective averages. Last but not 
least, the two leniency-related variables representing the respective first applicant and 
possible subsequent applicants reveal that about 16 percent of all groups in the data set 
successfully applied for leniency as first applicant – regularly receiving a fine waiver – while 
                                                            
24   In our sample, this is only the case for Printeos, a member of the Envelopes cartel (Case COMP/39.780). 
25  Aggravating circumstances considered by the EC are, e.g., repeat offenses, refusal to cooperate with the EC 
or the role of leader in an infringement. Mitigating circumstances, however, include, e.g., the provision of 
evidence that the infringement was terminated as soon as the EC intervened or proof that the anti-competitive 
conduct has been authorized or encouraged by public authorities or by legislation. 
26  We are fully aware of the fact that the final fine is affected by the settlement procedure. In this respect, it 
would be desirable to, e.g., use the basic fine as a measure for the expected fine. However as this information 
was often not available in the publicly available case documents, we use the final fine in our empirical 
analysis (thus assuming that it is highly correlated with the expected fine at the stage of the investigation). 
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a further 50 percent successfully received a fine reduction as leniency follower. Interestingly, 
for the sub-sample of settling firm groups, the respective percentage of firm groups that 
received a fine waiver is particularly high with an average value of 29 percent (compared to 
the 16 percent value for the entire sample).  
  Finally, regarding the case-related variables, Table 1 above reveals that about half of all 
firm groups operated in cartels that have been detected while operating. However, analyzing 
the respective values for the pre-settlement era and the settlement era separately reveals a 
substantial drop from 59 percent to 30 percent (suggesting changes in the types of cartels 
being detected by the EC). Furthermore, the settlement era sub-sample shows a remarkable 
increase in the share of firm groups that participated in cartels where the market was 
considered worldwide. While this characteristic was attached to only about 4 percent of all 
firm groups in the pre-settlement era, the respective value increased to about 34 percent in the 
settlement era. Last but not least, the number of firms involved in a cartel experiences a 
decrease from 15.2 firms in the pre-settlement era to 12.2 firms in the settlement era. 
4.2 Empirical Strategy  
Following the initial description of the construction of our data set and the descriptive 
statistics, we continue with the development of our empirical strategy. Based on our aim to 
assess the impact of the settlement procedure on the probability to file an appeal, the main 
empirical challenge lies in the separation of the effect of the settlement procedure and other 
confounding factors such as, e.g., changes in the composition of firms and cases.  
 In principle, a suitable empirical strategy to answer our research question would be to take 
all observations of the settlement era to identify the determinants of a firm’s decision to settle 
with the EC and to subsequently use this information to back-cast the respective decisions for 
the pre-settlement era. A simple comparison of the predicted shares with the actual shares 
would then give an indication how an earlier introduction of the settlement procedure would 
have affected the number of appeals.  
 Although the described empirical strategy appears straightforward, (at least) two severe 
obstacles prevent an application in our case. First, the fact that a firm is engaged in a 
settlement is the result of an iterative decision process with the EC deciding first whether to 
offer the opening of a settlement procedure – making use of (at least partly) unobservable 
criteria – and the firm subsequently being left with the final decision whether to settle or not. 
Second, as already discussed in Section 3 above, factors exist which make firms (or cases) 
more eligible for an application of the settlement procedure from the EC’s perspective (which 
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are partly perfectly correlated with the observable settlement decisions). For example, we find 
no case in our data with either a repeat offender or the presence of aggravating circumstances 
which was eventually settled. As a consequence, estimating a model without taking account of 
these factors would lead to biased estimates and predictions. 
 Due to these severe problems with the back-casting approach just described, we simply 
reverse our empirical strategy in the sense that we start off by estimating a model of a firm 
group’s decision to appeal an EC cartel decision in the pre-settlement era. This model is then 
taken to conduct an out-of-sample prediction of the firm group’s decision to file an appeal for 
the settlement era under the hypothetical (counterfactual) situation that the settlement 
procedure would not have been introduced.27 Subsequently, a comparison of the predicted 
with the actual shares allows conclusions on the effect of the settlement procedure on the 
probability to appeal.  
 Turning to the concrete implementation of our empirical strategy, the first step focuses on 
the identification of possible determinants of firm groups to file an appeal against a cartel 
decision by the EC. In this respect, our choice of variables is generally guided by the analysis 
of Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015), however, we implemented a few adjustments to improve 
the forecast performance of our models using a longer data set.28 As already mentioned in 
Section 4.1 above, we generally differentiate between three sets of independent variables that 
are likely to influence the probability to file an appeal: legal environment-related, group-
related and case-related.  
 Starting off with the legal environment-related variables, we control for the application of 
the revised 2006 EC Guidelines for the Method of Setting Fines (fine_glines_06) and of both 
the 2002 and 2006 EC Leniency Notice (len_notice) as all three reforms are likely to have 
increased transparency thus reducing the probability to appeal.  
 With respect to the group-related drivers of the decision to appeal, we, first, hypothesize 
that the larger the number of firms within one group (g_no_firms) the more likely it becomes 
that at least one firm identifies a reason to file an appeal (be it either alleged errors in the 
decision or other (tactical29) motives). Second, the longer the respective firm group 
participated in the cartel (g_dur), the more difficult it becomes for the EC to collect sufficient 
                                                            
27  An additional advantage of the ‘forecasting’ approach followed in this paper is that the decision to appeal is 
entirely with the firm group itself (while a settlement decision is made iteratively by the two (opposing) 
parties). 
28  These adjustments are driven by quality criteria such as the quality of in- and out-of-sample predictions or 
information criteria such as the AIC. 
29  As discussed in greater detail in Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015), possible tactical motives to file an appeal 
include the delay of fine payments (motivated by, e.g., current liquidity problems) or the postponement of 
follow-on private damage claims into the distant future.  
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evidence to decide on, e.g., the exact start date of cartel participation thereby increasing the 
probability that the firm group will disagree and therefore decides to appeal. Third, both 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances – identified by the EC during their case assessment 
– may influence the probability to appeal. While the presence of aggravating circumstances 
(g_c_acbi) such as status as ringleader leads to fine increases suggesting an increased 
probability to appeal the respective decision, the presence of mitigating circumstances 
(g_c_mcbi) such as a (erroneous) prior approval of an infringement by a public authority is 
expected to reduce the probability to file an appeal.  
 Fourth, for reasons similar to the aggravating circumstances just discussed, the 
characteristic as repeat offender (g_rep_off) may result in an increased probability to appeal 
the respective EC decision (e.g., as the respective firms are left with the impression that the 
EC imposed disproportionate fine levels for both punishment and deterrence purposes (see 
Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015)). Fifth, we further hypothesize that the larger the fine 
(g_def_fine_final), the larger are the consequences for the respective firms with respect to 
both share- and stakeholders and the larger, therefore, the desire to reduce the fine through an 
appeals process. Finally, we assume that cooperating with the EC as part of the leniency 
program reduces the firms group’ incentives to file an appeal. Due to the fact that leniency 
applicants have to fully cooperate with the EC in order to qualify for a fine reduction or even 
a fine waiver, the EC can base its fining decision on detailed documentation thereby reducing 
the probability of error. As only the first firm group that reports an infringement to the EC 
will receive a fine waiver – however, the following firm groups are still eligible to get 
(smaller but still significant) fine reductions – we capture the overall impact of the leniency 
program by two separate variables (g_lfirst and g_lfollower).  
 Last but not least, we include three case-related variables. First, we expect that it is easier 
for the EC to collect sufficient evidence for cartels that are caught while operating (c_detect) 
compared to cartels that were already terminated at the point of detection. Ceteris paribus, we 
therefore expect that a cartel ‘caught in the act’ have a reduced probability to file an appeal 
(as it anticipates the reduced success probabilities). Second, we hypothesize that both 
worldwide cartel markets (c_g_worldwide) and the number of cartel firms (c_no_firms) make 
it, on the one hand, more difficult for the EC to collect sufficient evidence. On the other hand, 
an increasing number of (non-European) countries and firms generally makes it more likely 
that at least one party decides to file an appeal. Both variables are therefore expected to have a 
positive effect on the probability to file an appeal. 
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 Turning to our main model to estimate the probability of filing an appeal, the binary 
character of our dependent variable – being equal to one if a firm group appealed the EC 
decision and zero otherwise – suggests an application of a Probit model (‘model (1)’) of the 
following form:  
ܲሺܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ ൌ 1|࢞,	Pre-Settlement Eraሻ ൌ ܨሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵᇱܺሻ 
with ܲሺܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ ൌ 1|࢞,	Pre-Settlement Eraሻ indicating the response probability of a firm 
group in the pre-settlement era30 to appeal an EC decision and ࢞ denoting the set of 
explanatory variables that determines a group’s decision to appeal. 
 As robustness check, we also conduct the same analysis using the same firm groups from 
the pre-settlement era plus all non-settled cases from the settlement era to calibrate our 
model.31 In this specification (model (2)), we additionally control for the applicability of the 
settlement procedure thus estimating a Probit model of the following form: 
ܲ൫ܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ ൌ 1ห࢞,	Non-Settled Cases൯ ൌ ܨሺߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵᇱܺ ൅ ߚଶsettle_noticeሻ. 
The estimated coefficients are then used to conduct an out-of-sample prediction of 
(hypothetical) appeals of firm groups in the settlement era absent the introduction of the 
settlement procedure (model 1) – and for model (2), absent the application of the settlement 
procedure. More specifically, for model (1), we use the following estimated latent equation to 
predict the probability of an appeal 
෠ܲሺܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ|࢞,	Settlement Eraሻ ൌ ܨሺߚመ଴ ൅ ߚመଵᇱܺሻ 
which is adapted to  
෠ܲሺܣ݌݌݈݁ܽ|࢞,	Settlement Eraሻ ൌ ܨሺߚመ଴ ൅ ߚመଵᇱܺ ൅ ߚመଶSettlement Noticeሻ. 
for model (2). For predicted probabilities ෠ܲ	above 50 percent, we classify the corresponding 
firm group as a hypothetical appellant. We are particularly interested in the respective 
predictions for firm groups that settled in order to assess whether the introduction of the 
settlement procedure was causal for the decline in appeals proceedings. 
4.3 Estimation Results 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. Along the lines of our 
empirical strategy, we start off with a discussion of the results for the probit estimations 
aiming at identifying important determinants of the decision to appeal an EC cartel decision. 
                                                            
30  Technically, this means that we use the data of all firm groups whose cases were decided between 2000 and 
2010, however, we exclude the first two atypical ‘test’ settlement decisions DRAMs (Case COMP/38.511) 
and Animal Feed Phosphates (Case COMP/38.866). 
31  In principle, it would be desirable to exploit the information from firm groups within settled cases that 
decided not to settle. However, the fact that to date only one such case exists – Animal Feed Phosphates 
(Case COMP/38.866) – makes such an endeavor unfeasible.  
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Following a discussion of the predictive power of the two different specifications, we proceed 
with an assessment of the respective out-of-sample predictions of appeals filings in the 
settlement era. 
 With respect to the determinants of the decision to file an appeal, Table 2 below reports the 
estimation results for our two sub-samples of non-settling firm groups. Subsample 1 includes 
all firm groups in the pre-settlement era while subsample 2 additionally incorporates all non-
settling firm groups in the settlement era.  
Table 2: Estimation Results for the Decision to File an Appeal (Avg. Marginal Effects) 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-Settlement Sample Non-Settlement Sample 
Legal environment-related variables 
fine_glines_06 -0.133** (0.07) -0.134** (0.07) 
len_notice -0.042 (0.07) -0.041 (0.07) 
settle_notice   -0.141* (0.08) 
Group-related variables 
g_no_firms 0.044*** (0.01) 0.048*** (0.01) 
g_dur -0.001** (0.00) -0.001** (0.00) 
g_c_mcbi 0.132** (0.07) 0.116* (0.06) 
g_c_acbi -0.164* (0.09) -0.184** (0.09) 
g_rep_off 0.321*** (0.11) 0.371*** (0.12) 
g_def_fine_final 0.003*** (0.00) 0.003*** (0.00) 
g_lfirst -0.566*** (0.07) -0.575*** (0.06) 
g_lfollower -0.074 (0.05) -0.076* (0.04) 
Case-related variables 
c_detect 0.102* (0.06) 0.108* (0.06) 
c_g_worldwide 0.046 (0.08) 0.173*** (0.06) 
c_no_firms 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 
Observations 430 517 
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.25 0.27 
Correctly classified 0.73 0.74 
False appeals for non-appellants 0.53 0.44 
Notes: For model (1), the sample consists of all cartel cases decided by the EC from 2000 until 2010 (the pre-
settlement era). For model (2), the sample consists of all cases from 2000 to 2015 which were not settled. Data is 
exclusively at the firm group level, i.e., firms that are linked through ownership and are jointly liable for fines 
are grouped together. The table shows average marginal effects (with standard errors clustered on the case 
level) for the firm groups for which all information was available; t statistics are in parentheses; * indicates p < 
0.1; ** indicates p < 0.05; and *** indicates p < 0.01. 
As the estimation results for the two models presented in Table 2 do not differ substantially in 
terms of both direction and significance of the explanatory variables, we concentrate our 
discussion on the results of model 1 and point out differences to model 2 when necessary.32 
Starting off with the legal environment-related variables, we find that firm groups fined under 
the revised 2006 EC Fine Guidelines have a significantly lower probability to file an appeal – 
compared to groups that were fined under the preceding guidelines from 1998 – thus 
                                                            
32  The results are comparable to those in Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015) who use a slightly different 
specification and a smaller sample of EC cartel decisions from 2000 to 2012. While the direction and 
significance of the respective variables remain unchanged, notable differences are the smaller coefficients 
regarding the variables fine_glines_06 and g_lfollower found here.   
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supporting our hypothesis derived above that the reform increased the transparency of EC 
cartel decisions. Furthermore, although the EC Leniency Program as such is not found to have 
a significant effect on the probability to file an appeal, the (diverging) results for the two 
specific leniency-related characteristics (first applicants and followers) will be discussed as 
part of the group-related variables below.  
 For the group-related variables, we find empirical support for our hypothesis that the 
probability to file an appeal increases with the number of firms in a group. However, against 
our prior expectations, the firm group’s probability to appeal is reduced with an increasing 
duration of cartel participation. Equally contradictory to our prior expectations are the results 
for the presence of both mitigating and aggravating factors. While the presence of the former 
leads to an increase in the probability to appeal, the coefficient of the latter shows a negative 
sign. As already argued in Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015), a possible explanation for the 
positive effect of mitigating factors is that the respective firm groups expected larger fine 
reductions than actually imposed by the EC and therefore decide with a higher probability to 
appeal the decision. For the aggravating factors, the substantial reduction in their presence in 
the settlement era – shown in Table 1 above – generally suggests that the observed effect is 
driven by a small number of firm groups/cases.  
 Again confirming our prior expectations, we find that repeat offenders are more inclined to 
challenge an EC decision through an appeal than first-time offenders. Furthermore, the size of 
the final fine imposed by the EC has the expected positive impact on the probability of filing 
an appeal. We also find support for our hypothesis that firm groups that participated in the 
leniency program have a significantly lower probability to file an appeal. On average, the 
probability of appealing an EC decision is about 57 percent lower for the first applicants and 
about 7 percent lower for the followers (compared to firms that did not apply for leniency). 
However, the latter coefficient is only significantly different from zero for model 2.  
 Last but not least, for the case-related variables, we find – against our prior expectation – 
that firm groups whose cartel was detected while operating have an increased probability to 
file an appeal. Additionally, we find support for our hypothesis that that firm groups who are 
part of worldwide cartels have a significantly higher probability of filing an appeal – however, 
the respective coefficient is only found to be significant in model 2 (which also includes non-
settled cases from 2011 to 2015 who generally show a substantially higher share of worldwide 
cartels as documented in Table 1 above). Finally, the expected positive effect of the number 
of firms involved in the cartel on the probability to appeal is neither found in model 1 nor 
model 2.  
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 Turning to an assessment of the predictive power of the two different specifications, the 
lower part of Table 2 reports different statistics who provide important further insights in this 
respect. While the McFadden Pseudo R2 values indicate that all our models predict the 
outcome better than the constant, the Pseudo R2 can only be compared for estimations with 
the same sample (size). In sum, both models are found to predict around three quarters of all 
appeal and non-appeal decisions correctly. However, it should also be stated clearly that in 
model 1 – for about half of the non-appealing firm groups – an appeal is falsely predicted. In 
that respect, the expanded sample taken as basis for our model 2 estimations provides better 
results.  
 Additionally, it is important to mention that the results for the settle_notice variable 
included in model 2 suggest that firm groups in cases that were decided in the settlement era 
but not settled have an about 14 percent lower probability of filing an appeal. Possible 
explanations for this result are (at least) twofold: on the one hand, a general time trend might 
lead to fewer appeals over time.33 If such a trend exists, the predictions of model 1 would be 
upward biased. On the other hand, the finding that non-settling firms file fewer appeals might 
be caused by a selection issue. In particular, it cannot be ruled out that the EC systematically 
selects cases for a settlement that would have had a high probability of an appeal (if not being 
settled). If parts of these determinants are unobserved, then model 2 would suffer from 
endogeneity by an omitted variable and our estimates are biased. Correspondingly, the 
predicted share of appeals in the settlement era would be downward biased. Taking both sets 
of arguments into account, it appears reasonable to use the predictions of model 1 as upper 
bound and those of model 2 as lower bound for the (hypothetical) number of appeals in the 
settlement era absent the settlement procedure.  
 Turning from the identification of important determinants of the decision to appeal an EC 
cartel decision to the respective out-of-sample predictions of appeals filings in the settlement 
era absent the settlement procedure, Table 3 provides actual and predicted shares of firm 
groups filing an appeal for both models. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
33  In fact, such a (negative) time trend is found in Hüschelrath and Smuda (2015) for a shorter sample of EC 
cartel decisions from 2000 to 2012. 
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Table 3: Prediction of Hypothetical Appellants in the Settlement Era 
 (1) (2) 
Actual Shares in Settlement Era 
Appeals 0.26 
Appeals | Settlement 0.02 
Appeals | No Settlement 0.43 
Predictions in Settlement Era 
Appeals 0.58 0.33 
Appeals | Settlement 0.53 0.26 
Appeals | No Settlement 0.61 0.38 
Quality of Out-of-Sample Predictions 
Correctly predicted appeals 0.79 0.66 
Correctly predicted non-appeals in non-settled cases 0.44 0.69 
 
As shown in Table 3, for model 1, the prediction for the settlement era is that 58 percent of 
firm groups would have filed an appeal instead of only 26 percent that actually decided to do 
so. This can mainly be attributed to hypothetical appeals by firm groups that decided to settle 
(53 percent would have appealed as opposed to 2 percent that actually have). This substantial 
difference between actual and hypothetical appeals suggests that the settlement procedure was 
also applied in cases in which the respective firm groups were rather prone to appeals 
proceedings. However, our results also show that model 1 predicts more appeals for firm 
groups in non-settled cases (61 percent in contrast to actual 43 percent). As discussed before, 
this result might be driven by an additional confounding factor in the settlement era leading to 
a different probability for firm groups filing an appeal. 
 Turning to the results for model 2, it is predicted that only 33 percent of firm groups would 
have filed an appeal in the settlement era (absent the settlement procedure). Furthermore, the 
model predicts that 26 percent of firm groups that settled the case and 38 percent of the non-
settlers would have appealed absent the settlement procedure. Interestingly, the latter number 
is closer to the actual share of appellants for the non-settling firm groups (which was expected 
as these firm groups were also included in the calibration of the model).  
 In sum, we find that our predictions of the hypothetical number of appeals in the settlement 
era (absent the settlement procedure) lie in a range from 33 percent (lower bound by model 2) 
to 58 percent (upper bound by model 1). As the actually observed appeals rate of 26 percent is 
clearly below this range, we can conclude that the introduction of the settlement procedure 
had a significantly negative impact on the probability to file an appeal. In absolute terms, we 
can say that out of the 149 firm groups convicted for cartelization in the settlement era, 
between 49 and 86 firm groups would have appealed the EC decision absent the settlement 
procedure, compared to the 39 firm groups that actually decided to do so. In other words, our 
estimation results suggest that the introduction of the settlement procedure avoided the filing 
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of between 10 and 47 appeals against EC cartel decisions only in the five year period from 
2011 to 2015 – a substantial reduction of between 20 and 55 percent.  
5 Conclusion  
In many jurisdictions, a significant share of legal disputes is not investigated and decided in 
court but is solved through bargaining as part of settlement procedures. Examples include 
settlements in patent litigation or – more generally – plea bargaining as settlement procedure 
frequently applied in criminal cases in the United States. Although the full set of motivations 
behind the introduction of settlement procedures partly differ, they all aim at saving resources 
in the form of legal fees, trial costs or the opportunity costs of time associated with a trial.   
 The 2008 European Union (EU) settlement procedure in cartel cases – allowing the 
European Commission (EC) to close investigations faster by eliminating or reducing several 
procedural steps required under the standard procedure – is no exception to this rule. 
Although the procedure has certain special characteristics as it, first, focuses on the 
relationship between a public authority and private firms and, second, it does not avoid an 
official investigation and decision, the key aim behind its introduction was the faster and more 
efficient handling of cartel cases by the EC.  
 However, beyond this direct impact of the introduction of the settlement procedure on the 
procedural efficiency of EC cartel investigations, the question is raised whether a measurable 
impact on the subsequent (and final) stage of the cartel enforcement process – the appeals 
process – can be identified. By avoiding a significant share of follow-on appeals cases, the 
positive overall welfare impact of the settlement procedure would likely increase substantially 
– given the fact that (in the pre-settlement era) on average 63 percent of all convicted firm 
groups decided to file an appeal against the respective EC decision triggering follow-on 
proceedings with an average length of about 57 months.   
 In this context, we have used a data set consisting of 579 firms groups convicted by the EC 
for cartelization from 2000 to 2015 to investigate the impact of the settlement procedure on 
the probability to file an appeal. Based on the estimation of a model of the firm’s decision to 
appeal in the pre-settlement era, we subsequently ran out-of-sample predictions to estimate 
the number of hypothetical appeals cases in the settlement era absent the settlement 
procedure. Comparing these estimates with the actual number of appeals, we found a 
settlement-induced reduction in the number of appeals of between 20 percent and 55 percent – 
saving not only the associated trial costs for the involved firms but also freeing additional 
resources at the respective appellate courts and the EC itself (as less time is needed to defend 
its position in court).  
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 Beyond these rather obvious (additional) savings achieved by the introduction of the 
settlement procedure through its knock-on effect on the number of appeals, the overall 
welfare implications demand a more differentiated discussion. First, it is important to remind 
of the important control and error-correction functions of the appeals process in legal systems. 
As a consequence, a reduction in the number of appeals can only be considered welfare-
enhancing if inefficient appeals proceedings are avoided (but efficient appeals are still 
brought). Although currently, there is no reason to believe that the settlement procedure deters 
efficient appeals, future research will have to investigate in greater detail what types of 
appeals cases are still brought and whether there are indications that the settlement procedure 
has a negative impact on the overall quality of EC cartel decisions (possibly anticipating that a 
subsequent (error-correcting) appeals process is much more unlikely).  
 Second, from an overall deterrence perspective, on the surface, the introduction of the 
settlement procedure as such could be considered as counterproductive as it reduces the 
expected fine for cartelization. However, this negative effect can be overcompensated by, 
first, an increase in the probability of detection by the EC if it invests the freed resources into 
the detection and prosecution of additional cartels. Second, overall deterrence may experience 
a net increase in the settlement era as the avoidance of a lengthy appeals process leads to 
quicker final public enforcement decisions on the respective cases and therefore allows a 
sooner start of follow-on private enforcement litigation. Although the size of this additional 
deterrence effect will largely depend on the success of the implementation of the Directive on 
Antitrust Damages Actions34 in the Member States of the European Union, it appears likely 
that the pressures on the cartel firms – and therefore the overall deterrence effect of anti-cartel 
laws – will increase rather than decrease in the years to come.  
  
                                                            
34  Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages 
under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union (PE-CONS 80/14). The Directive was signed into law on 26 November 2014 leaving the 
Member States two years to implement it in their national legal systems. 
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Annex 
Table 4: Variables in the Data Set  
Variable Type Description 
Legal environment-related variables  
settle_notice Binary =1 if the EC Settlement Notice was applicable 
fine_glines_06 Binary =1 if the EC Guidelines on the Method for Setting Fines (2006) were applied 
len_notice Binary =1 if the EC Leniency Notice (2002 or 2006) was applicable 
Group-related variables 
g_a1_appeal Binary =1 if group brought an appeal against the EC decision before the GC 
g_settlement Binary =1 if group settled  
g_no_firms Integer Number of firms within group 
g_c_acbi Binary =1 if aggravating circumstances were taken into account in the EC decision 
g_c_mcbi Binary =1 if mitigating circumstances were taken into account in the EC decision 
g_dur Integer Duration of cartel participation by the group, in months 
g_def_fine_final Integer Final fine imposed by the EC, in million Euros, deflated 
g_rep_off Binary =1 if group is a repeat offender 
g_lfirst Binary =1 if group successfully applied for leniency and was the first applicant 
g_lfollower Binary =1 if group successfully applied for leniency and was not the first applicant 
Case-related variables 
c_detect Binary =1 if cartel was detected before its end 
c_g_worldwide Binary =1 if cartel market is worldwide 
c_no_firms Integer Number of firms involved in the cartel 
Sources: Data on EC decisions obtained from EC case database; data on GC/ECJ decisions obtained from 
CVRIA database 
 
